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ARGUMENT

I.

The Department Relies on the Mutually Inconsistent Orders of the Department
and the Division to Try to Deny Muddy Boys Attorney Fees Under the Statute.
This appeal hinges on an unanswered question of law: what is the meaning of the

final sentence of Utah Code Annotated §58-55-503 (2014), which reads, "In an action
brought to enforce the provisions of this section, the court shall award reasonable attorney
fees and costs to the prevailing party"?
"When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, 'our primary goal is to
evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.' To discern legislative intent, we
begin by looking to the plain language of a statute." In re Adoption of R.B.FS., 2011 UT
46 U2, 258 P.3d 583, 587 (footnotes omitted). This Court has previously stated that,
"[w]hen examining...statutory language, we must assume the legislature used each term
advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App
206 U3, 189 P.3d 69, 73, citing State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 5416, 165 P.3d 1206. Here,
vJ

the plain language supports the conclusion that prevailing parties in Section 503 actions
shall be awarded reasonable fees.
However, both the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("the
Division") and the Department of Commerce ("the Department") issued orders holding
that attorney fees could not be awarded to Muddy Boys under Section 503. The orders of
the Division and the Department, while agreeing on the ultimate conclusion, gave mutually
inconsistent interpretations of the statute. The Division's June 19, 2017 Order ruled that,
while attorney fees were recoverable in actions to enforce any portion of Section 503, the

1
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word "court" restricted attorney fee awards to actions before a "district court." By contrast,
the Department's November 6. 2017 Order concluded that the placement of the attorney
fee provision in Subsection 503(5) (d) limits attorney fees to penalty collection proceedings.
The Department concluded that the location/numbering outweighed the plain language
chosen by the Legislature, and that "section" really meant "Subsection 503(5)." 1
The Response Brief claims that" [t]he Department held that the Division was not a
'court' and therefore did not have subject matter jurisdiction to award attorney fees and
costs based upon this statute" and cites R. 3. 5-14. However, the cited pages do not support
that conclusion. In fact, the holding that the Division was not a "court" was the basis of the
Division's Order (R. 707), not the Department's (R. 11). On appeal, the Department
amalgamates the two inconsistent Orders, borrowing from the reasoning of its own Order
(that reading the statute as a whole somehow means the fee provision only applies to the
final subsection and not the section as a whole) and the reasoning of the Division's Order
(that the formal adjudicative proceedings do not qualify as a "court"). Because the

1

The Department's Order made key holdings that " [r] egardless of the fact that
'section' usually refers to an entire section and not to a specific subsection of a statute, the
term 'section' in Subsection 503(5) (d) (' [i]n an action brought to enforce the provisions of
this section, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing
party') cannot be interpreted to refer to all actions before the judicial court and before the
Division presiding officers, because such an interpretation would overlook the context of
the language used." R. 13, 118. "The fact that the Legislature placed the subject language
under Subsection 503(5) is crucial to our interpretation of the statute." R. 13, U9. "The
Legislature's choice to place the language under Subsection 503 (5), which is all about
penalties imposed by the Division, indicates that "section" in Subsection 503(5)(d) refers
to Subsection 503(5) and not to all of Section 503; 'action to enforce the provisions' means
an action in the 'district court' to collect the penalty as provided in Subsection 503(5)(b)
and not a citation, immediate suspension or other adjudicative proceeding initiated by the
Division against a licensee." R. 13-14, U9.

2
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¼IP

Department's Order is the one precipitating this appeal, Muddy Boys will start with the
Department's "reading as a whole" argument.

II.

Reading the Statute as a Whole Supports Muddy Boy's Argument, not the
Department's.

Muddy Boys agrees that reading the statute as a whole is a proper method of
determining legislative intent. The plain language of Section 503, when read as a whole,
supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended to award fees in actions to enforce
any part of the section. The Department claims otherwise, but in doing so merely cites to
case law stating that statutes should be read as a whole and then concludes without
meaningful analysis that the statute as a whole supports its interpretation.
The Department cites Eaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2005 UT 78, 125 P.3d 901

v;

(2005), a case in which the Utah Supreme Court considered a mother's claim under her
own policy for underinsured motorist benefits for the death of her adult son who was not a
resident of her household, not named in the policy, and not injured by a listed vehicle. Id.
at 902. Ms. Eaquinta argued that UIM statute mandated coverage for damages for death.

Id. at 904. The Utah Supreme Court construed "the language in light of the legislature's
general purpose as reflected by the statute as a whole." Id. From another subsection, "it
[was] apparent that the legislature did not intend to require automobile insurance
companies to provide UIM coverage to insureds in situations where a third party, not
covered by the applicable insurance policy, is injured and killed." Id. The Department does
not show how the reasoning of Eaquinta supports a conclusion that the fee provision of

3
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section 503 was intended to be limited to the final subsection even though the Legislature
chose to apply it to actions under the u section."
The Department also cites two cases where a litigant tried to read a statutory
provision in isolation when the rest of the statute removed an otherwise plausible meaning
of the provision: Monarrez v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2014 UT App 219,335
P.3d 913, affirmed2016 UT 10,368 P.3d 846, and Huckins v. Rolfe, 2009 UT App 22,204
P.3d 186. Neither case is applicable to the case at bar where Muddy Boys is asking the
II

court to look at the whole statute to determine the context of an action brought to enforce
II

the provisions of this section." Muddy Boys has pointed out how action" has been used
in Subsection (4) and how the terms "section" and "subsection" have been used throughout
Section 503. It is the Department, not Muddy Boys, that is reading subsection 503(5) (d) in
isolation.
The Department is largely ignoring the statutory language in order to draw an
inference from the passage's numbering and location that Subsection (5) should be read as
an isolated unit inconsistent with the plain language applying the fee provision to the whole
section. Read in isolation, it appears plausible that subsection (5) (d) could refer to the
penalty collection proceedings of (5) (c). However, reading the statute as a whole, the plain
language instead shows that (5) (d) refers to the whole of Section 503, not just subsection

(5).
First, the term "an action" appears earlier in this Section in 58-55-503 (4) (i) (i) (B) (I)
with a meaning inconsistent with the meaning the Department seeks to give it in Subsection

4
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503(5) (d). Subsection (4) makes clear that "the division" may initiate "an action." The term
11

an action" is not limited to judicial action as the Department argues.
Furthermore, the Legislature declined to use the language of (5)(c) in (S)(d).

Subsection 5(c) describes "any action to collect the penalty." Subsection S(d) fails to use
that shorter and simpler phrase and instead states "an action brought to enforce the
provisions of this section" 2 not an "action to collect the penalty.II This indicates the
II

Legislature's intent to follow the broader definition of an action" in Subsection (4) and
not simply limit fees to penalty collection actions. The Department appears to concede in
its Order that the plain meaning of "action" is not limited to judicial proceedings: "The
term 'action' may be used in a statute to refer to an action before the judicial courts or one
before an administrative agency." (R. 11).
The Division brought an enforcement action against Muddy Boys by serving it with
a Notice of Agency Action expressly referencing Section 58-55-503 of the Utah Code. (R.
1592-93,

,s).

This type of enforcement action is provided for by Subsection 58-55-

503 (4) (a). The plain language provides for fees in "an action brought to enforce the
provisions of this section," not "an action for civil enforcement of an order" or "judicial
enforcement of an imposition of penalty." Nothing in Subsection 503(5)(d) limits fee
awards to "civil enforcement" or enforcement of "an order."

2 In

fact, while Subsections (5)(a), (5)(b), and (S)(c) all expressly use the term "penalty,"
Subsection (5) (d) does not. It instead uses a longer and broader phrase to avoid limiting
fee awards to "penalty" proceedings.

5
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The Utah Legislature knows how to distinguish judicial enforcement actions from
agency enforcement actions. The last sentence of Subsection (2) of Section 58-67b- l l 8
(2017) states, .. In the eventjudicial enforcement is necessary, the prevailing party shall be
awarded all costs of such litigation including reasonable attorney fees." By contrast, the
Legislature did not limit attorney fees to "judicial enforcement" actions in Section 58-55503 (2014).
Most telling of all, the Legislature chose by its language to apply Subsection (S) (d)
to the whole section and not just to Subsection (5). In its Response Brief, the Department
assiduously avoids any mention of the use of .. section" versus "subsection." As Muddy
Boys amply demonstrated, the extreme care of the Legislature in this particular Section to
parse correctly the uses of "section" and "subsection" is irreconcilable with a conclusion
that the use of "section" in Subsection (5) (d) ·was inadvertent. In this one section alone, the
Legislature distinguished 39 uses of a form of "subsection" from 13 uses of "section." The
use of "section" in subsection (5) (d) must be presumed intentional. Unless "section" is read
as "subsection," the Department's argument fails.
The avoidance of the "section" versus "subsection" debate in the Response Brief is
inconsistent with the holdings of the Department's Order from which this appeal arises that
"section" must by context be read as "subsection." The Department in its Order held that
[r]egardless of the fact that 'section' usually refers to an entire section and
not to a specific subsection of a statute, the term 'section' in Subsection
503(S)(d) (' [i]n an action brought to enforce the provisions of this section,
the court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing
party') cannot be interpreted to refer to all actions before the judicial court
and before the Division presiding officers, because such an interpretation
would overlook the context of the language used.

6
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R. 13, 118.
The fact that the Legislature placed the subject language under Subsection
503(5) is crucial to our interpretation of the statute.

R. 13, ~19. The Department further held,
The Legislature's choice to place the language under Subsection 503(5),
which is all about penalties imposed by the Division, indicates that "section"
in Subsection 503(5) (d) refers to Subsection 503(5) and not to all of Section
503; 'action to enforce the provisions' means an action in the 'district court'
to collect the penalty as provided in Subsection 503(5) (b) and not a citation,
immediate suspension or other adjudicative proceeding initiated by the
Division against a licensee.
R. 13-14, ~19.

The Department's request to read the statute as a whole is really a request to
recognize an inference contrary to the plain language of "section" based on the location of
the attorney fee language in Subsection (5) (d) instead of a theoretical Subsection (6). But
that position asks the Court to substitute its judgment for the Legislature and rewrite the
~

statute. See, Perry v. First Nat. Bank, 459 F.3d 816, 821 (7 th Cir. 2006) ("According to
Perry, if Congress intended§ 1681m(h) (8) to apply to all of§ 1681m, it would have made
§ 1681m(h)(8) into its own subsection,§ 1681m(i). We are not persuaded. It was logical

for Congress to place§ 1681m(h) (8) where it did, at the very end of the statute."). See also,

White v. E-Loan, Inc., 409 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ("As an initial matter,
the hierarchical placement of§ 1681 m (h) (8) may not be ideal, but in the Court's view it is
preferable to have a less-than-ideal placement of the provision than a strained reading of
the word 'section.'"); McCane v. America's Credit Jewelers, Inc., No. CIV.A. 05 C 5089,
2005 WL 3299371, at *4 (N.D.111. Dec. 1, 2005) ("The location of the statutory language,
7
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however, says nothing about the meaning of the term 'section.' No rule of statutory
interpretation requires the court to ignore an unambiguous term in favor of an inference
based on the term's location.") .
The Department's proposed reading of Subsection (S)(d) is squarely at odds with
the Division's reading of the same statute.
[T] he Division does not argue that attorney fees can only be awarded by the
applicable court in a judicial enforcement action brought to collect unpaid
penalties under Subsection 58-55-503(5)(b). Instead, under Subsection 5855-503(5)(d), attorney fees and costs can also be awarded by the applicable
court in judicial actions brought by the Division to enforce cease and desist
orders [under subsection 4], by seeking injunctions or temporary restraining
orders, even when no unpaid penalties are sought by the Division.

(R. 825). It is telling that, reading the statute as a whole, the Division reached a different
conclusion than the Department. The Division appears to have been using the attorney fee
~

provision to its benefit in actions under Subsection (4), but only now seeks to read
Subsection (S) (d) as limited to Subsection (5) so that it can avoid liability in the present
case.

III.

~

Applying 503{5){d) to the Entire Section as Written Does Not Lead to an
Absurd Result.

The Department attempts to make an argument based on the absurdity doctrine
claiming that applying the attorney fee clause to all of Section 503 would lead to an absurd
result. However, the Department never really fleshes out its absurdity doctrine argument
or demonstrates how it satisfies the rigorous requirements of that doctrine.
This court has developed a narrow, exacting standard for determining
whether to apply the absurdity doctrine and read a statute contrary to its plain
meaning. In particular, this court will not apply the absurdity doctrine unless
"the operation of the plain language ... [is] so overwhelmingly absurd that no

8
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rational legislator could have intended the statute to operate in such a
manner." This standard is satisfied only if the legislature could not
reasonably have intended the result.
v;)

Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, 128, 387 P.3d 1000, 1010 (citations omitted).
The absurdity doctrine is a narrow exception the Department does not come close
to satisfying. The Department cites HUF. v. WP. W, 2009 UT 10, 203 P.3d 943 (2009),
a case where a putative father tried to read an Arizona statute as placing no real time
constraints on him in asserting paternity in opposition to a planned adoption. The Court
noted that said reading "produces an absurd result and contradicts the plain language of
the statute." Id. at ~32 (emphasis added). Where the Department is arguing that the plain

meaning of "section" should be disregarded, the H U.F case is inapposite.
The Department argues that "there is nothing in subsection (5) (d) that would limit
its application to just subsection 4." Muddy Boys agrees. Subsection 503(5) (d) expressly
provides for fees in "an action brought to enforce the provisions of this section."
Subsections (1) and (2) set forth the severity of the offenses, but do not expressly provide
the mechanism for the enforcement action. Likewise, Subsection (3) sets forth the
"Grounds for immediate suspension of a licensee's license" without describing an "action."

0P

Subsection (4), by contrast, sets forth the mechanisms for enforcement actions under
the section. For this simple reason, Muddy Boys has cited to Subsection (4) rather than to
Subsections (1) through (3) for examples of actions in which attorney fees would be
recoverable. Subsection (4) is not divorced from Subsection (1). Subsection (1) enumerates
the violations qualifying as "a class A misdemeanor." Subsection (4)(a) provides that if
"the division concludes that a person has violated" those same enumerated statutes listed
9
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in Subsection (1) "and that disciplinary action is appropriate, the director or the director's
designee from within the division shall promptly issue a citation," attempt settlement, or
send notice to appear in an adjudicative proceeding. This is the express enforcement action
mechanism for Subsection (1) that Section 503 provides. The Department's attempt to
compartmentalize the Subsections and to read them in isolation from each other is contrary
to the structure and intent of Section 503.
The Department tries to make an absurdity argument based on supposed "criminal
prosecutions brought under subsections 1 and 2 of section 503." However, those
subsections do not expressly provide for such prosecutions independent of Subsection (4).
Moreover, the absurdity doctrine is a high standard requiring a showing that "no rational
legislator could have intended" the result of the plain language. See Bagley, supra. The
Department does not make such a showing. Even if Subsections (1) and (2) had express
criminal prosecution provisions, it does not follow that awards of attorney fees in criminal
cases are per se absurd or blatantly inoperable. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court recently
considered a statute awarding fees incurred in criminal proceedings and affirmed an award
of fees to the acquitted accused without identifying any unworkability in awarding fees
after criminal prosecution. See Christensen v. District, 2017 UT 47.
The Department has asserted "absurdity" without real, meaningful analysis of why
no rational legislator could have intended the plain language of Subsection 503(S)(d). This
type of threadbare issue spotting without analysis improperly attempts to dump the burden
of argument and research on the appellate court in violation of the court's "proper judicial
function." Utah Physicians for a Healthy Env't v. Exec. Dir. of Utah Dep't of Envtl.
10
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vJ

Quality, 2016 UT 49, 391 P.3d 148 127. In essence, the Department is arguing that its
rewritten version of the statute would be better policy, but that does not make the
Legislature's wording "absurd" or permit an agency or appellate court to second-guess the
Legislature. Outfront Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2017 UT 74134 and fn. 38.

IV.

The Department Tries to Impose an Artificially Narrow Definition of "Court"
to Avoid the Result of a Fee Award, Despite Inconsistent Language in its Own
Prior Order.
Muddy Boys overwhelmingly demonstrated in its opening brief that the Department

erred by interpreting "section" to mean "subsection." The legal authorities are so one-sided
lJj

that the Department now feels compelled to largely abandon its argument, as Muddy Boys
predicted might happen. (Appellant's Brief, p. 28). Having recognized the error of the
reasoning behind its own Order, the Department is now in the unenviable position of having
to advocate for the legal reasoning of the Division, which the Department rejected as being
unpersuasive in the Department's own Order. Accordingly, the Department is now trying

~

to argue that "court" cannot refer to an administrative law court, which is a clear change in
the Department's position. The Department's Order below refused to employ such a narrow
definition of "court" and properly acknowledged that the term "is used broadly in agency
adjudicative proceedings .... " R. 11, 116. The Department felt the Division's argument was
so weak that it refused to adopt it below and instead developed an entirely separate basis
for ruling against Muddy Boys in its own Order (i.e., that "section" means "subsection").
The Department now attempts to revert to the Division's ruling out of necessity. This
change suggests the Department is striving to achieve a desired outcome (i.e. to protect its

11
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budget) rather than to fairly and impartially apply the law. It gives a clear impression to
citizens such as Muddy Boys that they cannot be treated fairly by the Department.
The Department's current argument ignores the dictionary meaning of "court" and
instead seeks to impose an artificially narrow reading of "court" to try to change the
meaning of the other terms in the attorney fee clause. The Department's argument
interprets§ 58-55-503(d) to read: "In oo a judicial action brought to enforce the provisions
of #tts subsection

ill,

the district court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to

the prevailing party." Such a reading is improper because a court is not permitted to read
substantive terms into a statute. See Dircks v. The Travelers Indemnity Co. of America,
2017 UT 73123 ("reiterating our reluctance to infer substantive terms that are not set forth
on the face of a statute").
"Court" is not a defined-term in the statute, and accordingly, it must be read literally
and given its plain meaning. See, e.g., Cook v. Department of Commerce, 2015 UT App
64, i13, 347 P.3d 5, 9. The Utah Supreme Court "has a long history ofrelying on dictionary
definitions to determine plain meaning." State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986, 990 (Utah 1999). See

also, Cook at ~13. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016) defines "court" as "an official
assembly for the transaction of judicial business" or "a place (as a chamber) for the
administration of justice" or "a judge or judges in session" or "an assembly or board with
legislative or administrative powers." Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1934) defines "court" as
"[a] body in the government to which the public administration of justice is delegated."
The Department cites no dictionary definition supporting its narrower reading of "court."

12
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vi)

When examining the language of the Constitution of Utah, the Utah Supreme Court
said this about the meaning of the term "court":
The term "court" connotes a governmental institution in which is vested the
judicial power of the State. The concept of a court is much broader than that
of a judge. In essence, a "court" is a tribunal, authorized by law, at the
appropriate time and place, to administer justice; a "judge" is an officer or
member of such tribunal.

0J

Baumgaertel v. Salt Lake County, 560 P.2d 325 (1977). While Muddy Boys, against its

will, 3 was assigned to a court presided over by an administrative law judge rather than a
district courtjudge, the administrative law judge's court was the tribunal authorized by law
to administer justice to Muddy Boys in this instance and meets the dictionary and common
usage definitions of "court."
The Department's recent attempt to argue that the plain meaning of "court" does not
include administrative courts rings hollow when the Department's own Executive Director
clearly expressed a contrary view in her Order. R. 11, U6. She clearly believes "court"
0D

refers to administrative courts. She is not alone in her belief. In this very action both the
Division's own counsel and the administrative law judge used the word "court" to describe
the administrative court overseeing these proceedings. (R. 817; R. 1309A, 142:21-22).
These are not isolated examples. The phrase "administrative law court" appears in
approximately 1,000 opinions nationwide. The phrase "administrative court" appears in
about as many again. In fact, elsewhere in Title 58, the Utah Legislature states, "All courts

3 The

Division denied Muddy Boys access to a district courtjudge by denying its
objection to the conversion of the matter from an informal to a formal adjudicative
proceeding. Doing so deprived Muddy Boys of a de novo review by the district court.
13
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shall take judicial notice of the Compact and the rules in any judicial or administrative

proceeding .... " Utah Code Ann. § 58-67b-117(2) (2017) (emphasis added). See also,
Rules 1(b) and 18 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
II

The Department attempts to import the definition of Agency" from Utah Code
Annotated Section 63G-4-103 into Subsection 58-55-503(5)(d) to interpret the word
11

court." However, Subsection 503 (5) (d) neither uses the word "Agency" nor adopts the
II

definition of that term given in Section 63G-4-103. The definition of Agency" found in
Section 63G-4-103 has no application outside Chapter 4 of Title 63G; the statute states that
(Ji.,,

the definition is only applicable "[a]s used in this chapter." Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-103.
Subsection 503 (d) does not even appear in t}:ie same title, let alone chapter as that definition
of "Agency." The Department's example is far from probative, given the contrary
II

definition of "Court" in Utah Code Annotated §78B-20-102, where court" is defined to
mean "a tribunal, including an administrative agency." Like the definition of "Agency,"
that definition is limited to the chapter in which the definition appears.

~

When looking at other authorities describing a "court," it is important to look at the
context, given that many statutes, rules, and appellate opinions are dealing with a subset of
the term. Subsection 503(5) (d) makes no attempt to qualify the type of "court" that awards
fees. Other statutes, rules, and appellate opinions, by contrast, discuss subsets of" court" as
indicated by the qualifiers attached to the term. 4

These subsets of "court" include "court of competent jurisdiction" (U.C.A. § 58-1401 (2)(c)), court of appropriate jurisdiction" (U. C.A. § 58-41-15), "administrative
agency" (U.C.A. § 78B-20-102), "agency, commission, or board" (U.R.A.P. Rules 1 and
18), "Provo administrative court[]" (Peterson v. Provo City, 2002 UT App 430), "probate
4

11
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Whether a case is discussing the meaning of "courts of the state" under the
Constitution of Utah, "courts of record" under the Utah Code, or "court" under the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure is going to determine what subset of "court" is being
discussed. These examples show why the cases cited by the Department are distinguishable
from the use of "court" in Subsection 503 (S)(d), because the case law examples arise in
situations where the word "court" is not considered in isolation, but is part of a longer
phrase. For instance, the Department cites Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Com 'n, 2009 UT 71,
222 P.3d 55, where the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature had not made
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure binding on administrative adjudications. Id.
at 116. The Department's argument appears to be that if the "court rules" are not binding
upon an agency, it cannot be a "court." However, the Frito-Lay opinion is expressly
looking at the phrase "the courts of the state" (id. at ! 17), which is not the phrase used in
Subsection 503(5)(b). Also, the Legislature expressly made the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure relevant to discovery in agency formal adjudicative proceedings: "If the agency
does not enact rules under this section, the parties may conduct discovery according to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-205(1). See also, Utah Code
Ann. § 63G-4-209(3)(a). By the Department's logic, small claims court would not be a

court" (U.C.A. § 58-9-603(2)(c)), "courts of justice" (U.C.A. § 78A-1-101), "courts of
record" (id.), "Supreme Court" (id.), "Court of Appeals" (id.), "juvenile courts" (id.),
"justice court" (U.C.A. § 78B-1-122), "small claims court" (U.C.A. § 78A-8-101), "district
court" (U.C.A. § 58-55-503(5)(b) (2014)), "trial court" (U.C.A. §78B-1-102(2)),
"convicting court" (U.C.A. § 78B-5-505(3)), "Utah Military Court" (U.C.A. § 39-1-50),
"foreign court[]" (U.C.A. § 78B-5-320(3)), and "judicial court" (Kirk v. Div. of
Occupational & Profl Licensing, Dep't of Commerce, State of Utah, 815 P.2d 242, 244
(Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
15
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"court" because it is even less bound by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Frito-Lay
opinion has nothing to do with the meaning of Subsection 503(5) (b).
The other case that the Department cites, Morgan v. Dep 't of Commerce, 2017 UT
App 225, 414 P.3d 501, is even less on point. The Utah Court of Appeals determined that
an administrative disciplinary proceeding was not a " [c] ivil action" as defined in Chapter
2 of Title 78B of the Utah code; and, therefore, the statutes of limitations expressly tied to
"[c]ivil actions" did not apply to agency proceedings. The Court of Appeal's ruling is
specifically tied to the language of Utah Code Annotated Section 78B-2-102, which is not
at issue here. Id. at !8. Furthermore, unlike Section 58-55-503, Section 78B-2-101 defines
the word "action" by specifically referencing "counterclaims and cross-complaints" as
opposed to notices of agency action. Id. at ~8 and fn. 6.
Read in context, Section 503 primarily describes agency enforcement options, and
taken as a whole is incompatible with a narrow definition of "court." The specific choice
of the Legislature to use "section" rather than "subsection" is also incompatible with a
narrow definition of" court." The unfettered discretion of the Division to permit or prohibit

de nova district court review is further incompatible with a narrow definition of "court,"
which could potentially allow attorney fee awards in informal proceedings once they are
before a district court judge, while denying fees in the same case that the Division in its
sole discretion opts to keep before itself in an formal adjudicative proceeding before an
~

administrative law judge.

16
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V.

Muddy Boys' Other Issues are Properly Before This Court.
The Department's Order avoided addressing key issues concerning conflict of

interest and failure to follow governing statutes. Instead it held that Section 503 granted no
v.rP

authority to the agency to award attorney fees and, therefore, there was no jurisdiction to
consider misconduct or conflicts of interest. As Muddy Boys has described at length, the
plain language of Section 503 not only authorizes but mandates an award of attorney fees
to the prevailing party. The Executive Director's jurisdictional conclusion is, therefore, in
error. Given that any remand is likely to repeat the same issues of conflict of interest and
failure to follow governing statutes that arose in the first instance, "in the interest ofjudicial
economy, 'a brief discussion of these issues is appropriate as guidance for the trial court
on remand.'" Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ~38, 70 P.3d 35 (citation
~

omitted). See also, State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 108 (Utah 1988) {addressing issues although
they were unnecessary in making the determination to remand "to provide the trial court
with some guidance").

09
Muddy Boys' motion for attorney fees and costs was supposed to be governed by
the procedures in Utah Code Ann. §58-1-109 (2017), requiring a recommended order from
the ALJ. Once the recommended order was issued, the Division Director had three options:
(1) informally adopt the ALJ 's recommended order by taking no action for twenty days,
(2) issue his own order affirming, modifying, or rejecting the recommended order of the
ALJ (assuming no conflict of interest), or (3) designate another person within the division
to issue a final order. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-109 (2017).

17

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The failure of the Division to disclose the existence or non-existence of a
recommended order from the ALJ is prejudicial to Muddy Boys, as it could render the
Orders being appealed from entirely moot. The AL]' s Order could have become final long
before the Division Director acted. It also increases the perception of unfairness that has
existed in the eyes of Muddy Boys since the start of these proceedings.
The Department also failed to address the inherent conflict of interest in allowing
the financially-invested Division Director to issue an order on the Division's financial
liability in lieu of the independent administrative law judge. Any matter sent back to the
Division is subject to the same claims that the Division Director has a financial stake in the
outcome and should not be issuing an order concerning fees against his own organization.
Methods are already set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 58-1-109 to deal with such
conflicts of interest.
The Department argues that "[t]his Court only has authority to review the
Department's final action" and cites Utah Physicians for a Healthy Env't v. Exec. Dir. of

~

Utah Dept. ofEnvtl. Quality, 2016 UT 49,391 P.3d 148 U2. However, that case is patently
distinguishable. In Utah Physicians, the petitioners had challenged a permit from the
Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality authorizing changes at a refinery. Id. at U.
Thereafter, the Executive Director of the Department of Environmental Quality appointed
an ALJ to conduct adjudicative proceedings reviewing the permit. Id. The ALJ, unlike in
the present case, issued recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a proposed
disposition, which the executive director adopted as a final order. Id. Unlike the present
case, the petitioners "altogether failed to address their opening brief and arguments to the

18
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final order, opting instead to attack only the sufficiency of the actions of the" division
director. Id. at 12.
Failure to decide all the issues requiring resolution is a valid statutorily-based
ground for challenging the Department's final order. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4403(4){c). This ground is on top of the errors in interpreting Section 503 in the
Department's Order.

VI.

The Amount of Muddy Boy's Fees and Their Reasonableness Are Not in
Dispute.
There is no question as to the amount or reasonableness of Muddy Boys' fees and

costs through January 4, 2017. They total $84,309.68. At no time in the briefing did the
Division challenge the same. (R. 812-13, 822-23). Muddy Boys established both amount
and reasonableness at great length in its motion for fees. Neither amount nor
reasonableness was challenged by the Department. Again in its Appellate Brief, Muddy
Boys raised the specific amount and the fact it was uncontested. It remains uncontested
after the Department's Response Brief. The Department did not address it in its Response
Brief or elsewhere.
In South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Utah App. 1988) a title
company similarly opposed a request for attorney fees on the grounds that the fees were
not legally recoverable, but did not challenge the reasonableness or necessity of the amount
of fees being claimed. The district court agreed the fees were not recoverable. The Utah
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the fees were recoverable, and remanded with
instructions to enter an attorney fee award in the amount that had been sought below, since

19
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that amount had not been opposed. Id. In keeping with South Sanpitch, it is appropriate to
remand with instructions to award Muddy Boys the $84,309.68 in attorney fees and costs
it incurred through January 4, 2017.

The remand order should also direct that Muddy Boys be awarded the reasonable
costs and fees it has incurred since January 4, 2017, in an amount to be determined through
further proceedings. The fees and costs incurred on these appeals are recoverable. See

Salmon v. Davis Cty., 916 P.2d 890, 895 (Utah 1996) ("This court has interpreted attorney
fee statutes broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a statute initially
authorizes them")." [W]hen a party is entitled to attorney fees below and prevails on appeal,
that party is 'also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.'" Cheney v. Hinton

Burdick Hall & Spilker, PLLC, 2015 UT App 242, U9, 366 P.3d 1220, 1226 (quoting
Dillon v. Southern Mgmt. Corp. Ret. Tr., 2014 UT 14, ~61, 326 P.3d 656 with internal
quotation from Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)). See also, C.E.

Butters Realty & Const., Inc. v. McFarland, 2004 UT App 196.
The Department of Commerce is not the fact-finder, so remand to the Division
should include instructions that the matter of fees and costs since January 4, 2017 be
handled by the ALJ, and not by the financially-invested Division Director. Furthermore,
the ALJ should issue a recommended order as required by Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-109
(2017).

VII.

The Department's Response Lacks Transparency or Accountability.
The Department's failure to make a direct response to the statutory and due process

violations is symptomatic of a deeper problem with this appeal-the agency's lack of
20
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transparency and accountability. Utah citizens rely on government agencies, such as the
Division, to administer justice and protect societal interests. However, when those applying
the law are themselves not following the law or refusing to be transparent, public
confidence in governmental institutions falters.
It is undisputed that the bad actor, Juan Layo, who affirmatively asserted that his
company was licensed when it was not, was prosecuted and fined $800. By contrast, the
Division pursued Muddy Boys for $116,000.00 for being victimized by Mr. Layo. The
Division attempted to attribute two remote prior offenses of a separate legal entity to
Muddy Boys to achieve a higher fine. As the first ALJ ruled, this would have only been
Muddy Boys' first violation {had there been a violation, which there was not). First
violation fines are limited by statute to $1,000.00.
The Division forced Muddy Boys to litigate for months without answering whether
the Division acknowledged controlling Utah law requiring the Division to establish mens
rea. While the Division finally conceded the law required mens rea, months later its

investigators revealed in informal interviews that they continued to treat licensing actions
as strict liability. (R. 852). The Division unilaterally, and over Muddy Boys' strenuous
objection, removed any de novo review before a district court by overruling Muddy Boys'
objections to the conversion to formal adjudicative proceeding. The record is replete with
warnings to the Division that its case lacked essential evidence; yet the Division pushed
doggedly on, forcing Muddy Boys to a formal hearing, where the Division finally had to
acknowledge it lacked evidence to establish a violation.
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The same pattern of refusal to acknowledge the obvious continues on appeal. The
Department persistently refuses to address due process complaints head-on. It is
particularly troubling that the Department will not acknowledge whether or not the
administrative law judge issued a recommended order as required by statute. Utah Code
Ann.§ 58-1-109(4) (2017). Given that the Division Director took over five months to issue
his own order in this case, any recommended order may have become final several times
over by operation of law 5 prior to the issuance of the Division Director's Order protecting
his own budget.
The ever-evolving arguments of the Department and the Division appear designed
to defend an outcome rather than to apply the law as written. For example, the Division
Director's Order held that Title 58 distinguished between "court" and "tribunal" even
though Title 58 doesn't ever use the word "tribunal." (R. 707). Similarly, the Division
simply brushed off Muddy Boys' due process concerns by saying that Muddy Boys' right
to a day in court "is purely figurative, not literal." (R. 827). Now the Department argues
that there is no jurisdiction to award fees when the legislature expressly included a fee
provision.
The Department should not be permitted to give Muddy Boys' due process concerns
short shrift. This is an accusatory proceeding requiring particular attention to stricter due
process. V-1 Oil Co. v. Dep 't of Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Utah 1997).
~

The risk of bias is "particularly realistic where an agency is required to determine

5 See

Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-109 (7) (2017), an administrative law judge's proposed
order becomes final if the division director takes no action for twenty days.
22
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compensation due to attorneys· representing parties who have defeated the agency's
position in an adversarial proceeding." Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 970 P.2d 702,
707 (Utah 1998).
Muddy Boys has fought hard and incurred significant legal expense to finally have
this case heard by a neutral body. It feels strongly that it has been treated unfairly and feels
that the opposing party (the Division) unfairly took the decision away from the ALJ and
issued a self-serving order to protect its own budget. Muddy Boys then observed the
Department uphold that decision, even after recognizing that the grounds used by the
Division were erroneous. The Department now recognizes its own analysis to have been
faulty and, rather than admit error, now tries to revert back to the decision of the Division
that it previously found to be erroneous.
Inequities abound-starting with the initial demand for $116,000 and continuing
through the Department's most recent decision. These agency actions have created a
perception of unfairness undermining Muddy Boys' confidence in the State. This needs to
be remedied. The Division has the power to affect licenses and livelihoods. Without checks
on that power, such as those the Legislature provided in the form of the fee provision and
appellate review, Utah citizens and Utah businesses would be vulnerable to the caprice of
those with the power to end livelihoods through fines, license restrictions, and defense
costs. Muddy Boys asks the Court of Appeals to be that check.
CONCLUSION

This was an action to enforce the provisions of Section 503. Muddy Boys was the
prevailing party and is entitled to fees. The statute mandates that those fees "shall" be
23
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awarded. The amount and reasonableness of those fees have never been challenged and
have been established. "Section" plainly means the entirety of Section 503, and not just
Subsection (5). The Department fails to cite to the dictionary or other non-specialized use
of the word "court" to support its contention that "court" should be read narrowly as
"district court." The Department gives no meaningful analysis why applying the fee
provision to the entire section as written would be absurd. It merely concludes without
analysis that any scenario where fees could be granted in a criminal action is absurd. Of
course, Utah has elsewhere granted fees in criminal actions. The Department's Order is
legally in error and should be reversed. The reversal order should award Muddy Boys fees
and costs of $84,309.68 through January 4, 2017, plus the reasonable fees and costs it has
incurred since that date pursuing its appeals.
An Order should further be entered precluding the Division Director from ruling on
Muddy Boys' attorney fee motion, due to a conflict of interest, and leaving the amount of
fees to be awarded on remand to the ALJ or another disinterested party. Alternatively,
should the court remand with an order requiring the Division to produce copies of its
communications with the ALJ related to this matter, including a copy of the AL]' s
recommended order, then Muddy Boys requests that it be awarded its fees and costs
incurred to-date as a sanction against Division, which fees and costs may not have been
necessary had the Division produced the requested documents when obligated to do so.
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